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Case Update: Coffey v Fraser Valley (Regional District) – Private Property Entry Limitations

The BC Supreme Court in Coffey v Fraser Valley (Regional District), 2018 BCSC 959 recently ruled on an alleged breach of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms arising from the entry onto private property by a local government. The court ruled that the Fraser Valley Regional District’s (the “FVRD”) inspection of outbuildings on the property did not violate the tenant’s right to be free from an unreasonable search. Further, the court ruled that on the facts in this case, the 6-month limitation period for bringing an action against a local government under section 735 of the Local Government Act, applies to claims for remedies under the Charter. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim was barred, having been filed 10 months after the inspection at issue.

This case discusses the extent and limitations of local governmental authority to enter onto private property, without a warrant, to determine whether bylaws are being complied with. The case also shows that the 6-month limitation period can be an effective tool for defending claims arising from warrantless entries.

Background Facts

The plaintiff, Peter Coffey, sought damages for trespass and a violation of his section 8 Charter rights against the FVRD. The plaintiff held a licence to produce medical marihuana, and grew and processed marihuana on the property. In 2013, the FVRD received notice of an application for a research and development license for the production of marihuana on the property. The FVRD advised the applicant that building and development permits would be required for any new construction.

The FVRD subsequently determined that there was at least one existing outbuilding on the property for which a building permit was not obtained.

In April 2015, the FVRD wrote to the owner and tenants of the property to arrange a mutually convenient time to inspect the property in relation to suspected building bylaw violations. The FVRD received no response. The FVRD’s building bylaw authorized inspections of property to determine whether the bylaw was being complied with. Under the bylaw, notice to the owner and tenant was required for inspections of occupied residences, but not for outbuildings.

Subsequently, the FVRD learned of complaints of sewage discharge from the property, and of gunshots having been fired near the property. In December 2015, the RCMP advised the FVRD that it was conducting an investigation of possible criminal offences on the property.

Due to safety concerns the FVRD requested a RCMP escort for an inspection of the property.

In January 2015, the RCMP advised the FVRD that its officers were conducting an investigation on the property, and that the residents were not present. The FVRD seized the opportunity to inspect the outbuildings on the property while the RCMP conducted its investigation. The FVRD identified a number of structures for which building permits had not been obtained, and posted ‘stop work’ and ‘do not occupy’ notices on the structures. The FVRD did not inspect the residence on the property.

Within about a week of the inspection, the plaintiff’s lawyer advised the FVRD that he considered the FVRD’s search to constitute trespass, on the basis that no warrant had been obtained. Approximately 10 Âœ months later the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the FVRD.

Legal Analysis

The plaintiff alleged that the FVRD’s inspection of the property breached his right to be free from unreasonable search under section 8 of the Charter. The plaintiff did not challenge the validity of the building bylaw itself.

The FVRD argued that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by section 735 of the LGA, having been filed more than 6 months after the inspection. The FVRD also argued that its inspection was authorized by section 419 of the LGA and its own building bylaw, and that it was not unreasonable.

Limitation Period Defence

There is case authority from other provinces which suggest that limitation periods contained in specific legislation should not apply to claims of alleged Charter breaches. However, the Court in this case ruled that section 735 of the LGA applies to claims of an alleged Charter breach in circumstances in which there is no evidence that the limitation period would operate unfairly or deprive the plaintiff of a just remedy. The Court found that the plaintiff was not deprived of a just remedy, because he was aware of a possible claim immediately after the inspection, (in fact his counsel had complained to the FVRD one week after the inspection), and yet the plaintiff waited 10 months to file the claim.

Section 8 of the Charter

An inquiry under section 8 of the Charter involves determining whether the plaintiff had an expectation of privacy with respect to the property being searched, and whether the search was reasonable. In this case, the property was a residential property for which the plaintiff clearly held an expectation of privacy.

To determine whether the search was reasonable (the second part of the inquiry), the court applied the test outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Collins [1987] 1SCR 265:

  1. Was the search authorized by law?
  2. Was the law reasonable?
  3. Was the manner in which the search was conducted reasonable?

The court found that the search was authorized by section 419 of the LGA and the FVRD’s building bylaw. Given that the plaintiff did not challenge the validity of those laws, the court proceeded on the assumption that those laws are reasonable.

Turning to whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner, the Court remarked that there was no requirement that the owner or tenant be present during the inspection, nor that they receive notice of the inspection. The Court further remarked that the FVRD had notified the owner and tenant of its intention to conduct an inspection (albeit nearly a year prior to the inspection), to which neither the owner nor the tenant responded. The Court noted that the FVRD was not under a duty to arrange a mutually convenient time to inspect the property, and was not required to follow-up with the plaintiff after receiving no response. As to the allegation that the FVRD was working with the RCMP, there was no evidence to support that characterization, and in any event any complaints of the RCMP’s conduct was not a matter to be determined in this proceeding. Finally, the Court remarked that the FVRD limited its inspection to outbuildings.

The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim under the summary judgment Rule 9-6, which is used where there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Lessons for Local Governments

This case confirms the extent of local governmental authority to enter and inspect private property without a warrant. In cases in which only outbuildings will be inspected, no notice is required (assuming the bylaw has the same wording as the FVRD’s building bylaw in this case). However, the provision of notice (even where not legally required) can still be of assistance in avoiding costly legal disputes and supporting the argument that any subsequent search was reasonable.

This case also confirms that section 735 of the LGA remains a powerful tool for defending against claims brought more than 6 months after the subject event. It bears noting that section 735 is limited to a certain category of claim against a local government, and not all claims in general.

Case Law Update – Century Services Corp v. LeRoy (2017 BCSC 1880)

A: Introduction

This case concerns whether a creditor’s non-disclosure of its billing practices will void a guarantee in an action to enforce a guarantee. Specifically, the appeal concerned whether the non-disclosure of such practices constitutes implied misrepresentation that may vitiate a guarantee.

The Court of Appeal decided that the trial judge erred in law in holding that the guarantee, which Ms. LeRoy entered into, was vitiated by misrepresentation.

B: Factual Background

The respondent Rebecca LeRoy guaranteed her husband’s company Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd. (“TLT”). TLT began to experience financial difficulty and was indebted to its creditor the Royal Bank of Canada (“RBC”) for approximately $18 million. TLT was unable to repay RBC for the debt and sought relief under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-35 (“CCAA”).

Eager to avoid bankruptcy, TLT entered into a loan agreement for high interest rate bridge financing with Century. Under this agreement, Century paid out RBC for its position as a secured creditor. Ms. LeRoy entered into a limited recourse guarantee for this loan agreement secured by a mortgage on the LeRoy residence. Mr. LeRoy was expected to refinance this mortgage in order to pay the funds to Century in exchange for a discharge of the mortgage. Ms. LeRoy’s guarantee secured a maximum of $2 million plus interest and costs. Ms. LeRoy had obtained independent legal advice in relation to the limited recourse guarantee before executing it.

In brief, the parties intended to have Century provide bridge financing to stave off RBC bringing TLT into bankruptcy. In exchange, the LeRoys would have several months to find a new lender to discharge Century’s mortgage and one year to secure a new lender for the TLT business.

Due to unexpected business reversals, TLT was unable to make the first payment to Century. TLT soon assigned itself into bankruptcy and authorized the sale of its assets to an auctioneer. The assignment into bankruptcy constituted an event of default under Century’s loan agreement and it immediately issued to TLT a demand for payment, and a demand for payment under Ms. LeRoy’s guarantee. Century then commenced foreclosure proceedings to realize on its security. Ms. LeRoy argued that the guarantee and the mortgage were unenforceable because Century had impliedly and fraudulently misrepresented to her at the time she entered into the guarantee.

C: Trial Decision

The trial judge dealt with two separate issues: first, the effect of misrepresentation on the validity of a guarantee where the misrepresentation is made at the time the guarantee is entered into. Secondly, the effect of a creditor’s subsequent misconduct on the validity of a guarantee. Ms. LeRoy argued that Century had misrepresented to her that it would comply with the terms of the loan agreement contrary to its true intentions to do so.

Ms. LeRoy did not read the documents, but she had obtained independent legal advice. She argued that the misrepresentation arose from Century’s implied conduct in proffering her the documents. She alleged that Century initially promised to perform the loan agreement according to its terms and that conversely, it had not intended to comply with the terms at all. Century had a standard practice of charging interest at the contractual rate on a loan balance and on fees and expenses, and capitalizing on employee time charged to a debtor’s account.

The trial judge found that Century engaged in misrepresentation as it did not check the language of the loan agreement to confirm that such charges were authorized. Century represented to Ms. LeRoy that it would adhere to the terms of the loan agreement and that it was indifferent as to whether it truly complied. Further, Ms. LeRoy relied on that representation and suffered a loss in becoming liable under the guarantee. However, the trial judge dismissed Ms. LeRoy’s argument that Century’s subsequent conduct in posting contested charges to TLT’s loan account was fraudulent as this did not increase the risk to Ms. LeRoy in being called to account for her guarantee.

D: Appeal Decision

Century appealed the trial decision based an error of law in treating the failure to disclose standard charging practices as a material misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that if a creditor makes express or implied misrepresentations at the time a guarantee is executed a guarantor may be discharged from liability. An implied representation may also be framed as a duty of disclosure. Such a duty may arise where no inquiry was made by the guarantor to the creditor. However, even where the guarantor makes no inquiry of the creditor, the type of information that ought to be disclosed under this duty is information that shows that the relationship between the creditor and principal is materially different from that which the guarantor might naturally expect.

The overall principles applicable to the scope of a creditor’s duty to disclose information even where a guarantor does not ask, includes the following:

  1. The information is material;
  2. “Materiality” is assessed on an objective basis. The query that must be satisfied is whether this information would be “likely to affect the mind of a reasonable guarantor in the position of the prospective guarantor”; and
  3. Finally, the information must be in relation to facts connected to the dealings between creditor and debtor or other guarantor who is subject to the guarantee that the surety would expect not to exist.

The Court held that such a narrow scope of disclosure facilitates efficient credit markets since prospective guarantors will be able to make informed decisions based on sufficient information regarding risks they will be assuming and lenders will not have to disclose information that is neither material nor unexpected.

The Court held that the trial judge erred in failing to determine whether the information related to Century’s standard charging practices was objectively material in the sense that it would likely affect the mind of a reasonable guarantor occupying Ms. LeRoy’s position. The Court determined that Century’s standard practices regarding posting charges did not affect the risk that Ms. LeRoy undertook in signing the guarantee. Ms. LeRoy’s subjective assertion as to the fact that she would not have undertaken the guarantee had Century disclosed its billing practices did not meet the objective test for material information. A reasonable person in Ms. LeRoy’s position at the time of the signing would not have been affected by the knowledge that if the loan went into default, Century would post charges that Ms. LeRoy would not be obligated to pay. Only the terms of the loan agreement and guarantee would govern regardless of Century’s billing practices.

Additionally, Century never expressly represented a material fact to Ms. LeRoy. She did not ask Century any questions in relation to the guarantee. Therefore, the analysis related to the scope of Century’s duty to disclose material facts as objectively assessed to Ms. LeRoy. The trial judge erred in treating Century’s proffering of the loan agreement as an express representation of an intention to abide by its terms. A breach of a promise to perform does not render a contract voidable. In order for Ms. LeRoy to be relieved as a guarantor, any representation that Century made had to be material as objectively determined.

D: Implications to Lenders

This decision makes it clear that non-disclosure of immaterial information will not be sufficient to release a guarantor of his or her liability under a guarantee. What is material information does not depend on what a guarantor subjectively believes is important. Where a guarantor does not ask lender specific questions with respect to the guarantee or loan, a lender’s duty to disclose certain information to equip a guarantor to make a reasoned decision to sign a guarantee will be narrow.

A lender’s failure to disclose any and all information will be insufficient to release a guarantor from being called to account on that guarantee. The only information that may release a guarantor of his or her liability is information that will affect the mind of a reasonable guarantor and be connected to the relationship of the creditor and the debtor which the guarantor would not be expected to anticipate.

A guarantor’s pledge to the principal debt is not to be taken lightly; it is a serious undertaking that will come with drastic consequences even where a creditor does not disclose certain standard practices. Overall, the law expects guarantors to exercise caution before signing on to a guarantee.

Please contact us should you wish to discuss the implications of this decision in more detail.

Checklist: What To Do When Someone Dies

Life is complicated, and especially so when losing loved ones. By preparing this broad checklist, we hope to provide you with some certainty and guidance through difficult times. We know that every situation is different and, if you have any questions, we are always here to help.

PRINTABLE CHECKLIST HERE

  1. Arrange Funeral and Obtain Death Certificates

Consider ordering at least 3 original Death Certificates, which can be ordered through the funeral home.

  1. Notify of Death
    • Canada Revenue Agency – income tax, GST/HST benefits, child tax benefits, etc.

Notify CRA at 1-800-959-8281 of the date of death as soon as possible, and send them a copy of the death certificate and a complete copy of the will or other legal document such as a grant of probate or letters of administration showing that you are the legal representative.

Website:https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/cra-arc/formspubs/pub/rc4111/rc4111-19e.pdf

    • Canada Pension Plan (CPP), Old Age Security (OAS)

If the deceased was receiving OAS or CPP retirement pensions, disability benefits or survivor benefits, these must be cancelled. Benefits are payable for the month in which the death occurs; benefits paid after that will have to be repaid.

Complete an Application Kit which is available from any Service Canada Centre, 1-800-277-9914, and many funeral homes. Have the SIN on hand when you call.

Website:https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/corporate/contact.html

    • Service Canada – Social Insurance Number

Advise of the death to reduce the possibility of someone else using the deceased’s SIN.  You will still be able to use the SIN for estate purposes.

Provide the SIN card and a copy of the Death Certificate to Service Centre Canada at the address below.  If you do not have the SIN card but know the number, provide a Death Certificate with the SIN clearly written on it.

Notification in person

520 Seymour Street,
Kamloops, British Columbia, V2C 2G9

Notification by mail

Service Canada, Social Insurance Registration Office
P.O. Box 7000
Bathurst, New Brunswick, E2A 4T1

Website:http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/sin/apply/how.shtml

    • Medical Services Plan (BC) – Contact to cancel MSP coverage, 1-604-683-7151(Vancouver) or toll free 1-800-663-7100.

Website:http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/topic.page?id=C331CE70072946C59276A8B4A936C08D

    • Extended medical and pension plan

Contact to determine eligibility for continue benefit coverage for dependents.

    • Bank accounts

Contact financial institutions to remove the deceased’s name from joint accounts and convert sole accounts in the name of the Estate and inventory safe deposit box.

    • Life Insurance companies

Advise of death, and request claim forms and confirmation of benefits.

    • RSP / RIF accounts

Advise of death and arrange for transmission to successor.

    • Post office

Notify post office and redirect mail to executor’s address.

    • Passport Canada – If the deceased has a valid passport (ie. not expired) mail in the passport to the Government of Canada Passport program at:

Passport Program
Gatineau QC K1A 0G3
Canada

Include a copy of the death certificate and a letter explaining whether you would like Passport Canada to return the cancelled passport to you or whether they can securely destroy it.

If the deceased did not have a valid passport (i.e. the passport was expired), you do not need to return it to Passport Canada. However, if you want Passport Canada to securely destroy it, send a letter, a copy of the death certificate, and the expired passport to the address above.

Website:https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/canadian-passports/help-centre/general.html#passport_deceased

    • Veteran’s Affairs

Cancel any veteran’s benefits by contacting Service Canada or phoning 1-866-522-2122.

Website:http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/contact

    • Driver’s Licence

Cancel by phoning a local ICBC Driver Licensing Office.  In Kamloops, B.C., phone 250-851-3700.

Website:http://www.icbc.com/about-icbc/contact-us/Pages/default.aspx

    • Senior’s Supplement or disability benefits

Cancel any by contacting Service Canada or phoning 1-800-277-9914.

Website: https://www.canada.ca/en/contact.html

    • Vehicle insurance

Cancel and obtain storage insurance by telephoning AutoPlan or the insurance broker.

    • Property Insurance

Obtain ‘vacancy’ insurance, if appropriate.

    • Credit Cards

Contact credit card companies to cancel credit cards (and halt interest accruing if possible).

    • Phone and Utility companies

Notify to change name on account and modify/cancel services if appropriate.

  1. Tax Returns

As executor (the “personal representative” of the deceased), you are responsible for filing a return for the deceased for the year of death. This return is called the T1 Final return.  You also have to file any returns for previous years that the deceased person did not file.

You must also file a T3 Trust Income Tax and Information Return, for income that the estate earned after the date of death, and for any trust created by the Will.

In all cases you are well advised to obtain a Clearance Certificate from CRA before making a final distribution of estate assets.

Website:http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/ndvdls/lf-vnts/dth/clrnc-eng.html

  1. Probate the Will or obtain a Grant of Administration (if no Will)

Probating an estate may or may not be necessary, depending on the nature of assets the deceased held at death.  The probate process involves obtaining an Administration Grant (i.e. the Grant of Probate) recognizing the person appointed in the Will as the executor, or, in cases where there is no Will, appointing a person as Administrator of the estate.   Executors and Administrators are now referred to as “Personal Representatives”.

After the Grant has been obtained, the Personal Representatives may call in (sell) estate assets, pay debts (including testamentary expenses, income tax and executor fees), pay legacies (gifts) and distribute assets to the beneficiaries of the Will (or according to the inheritance rules of the Province of British Columbia, in cases where there is no Will).

Lawyers frequently offer assistance to Personal Representative with the following estate administration tasks:

        1. drafting and filing the court documents necessary to obtain the Grant of Probate or Administration;
        2. selling land or removing deceased’s name from title to land where there is a surviving joint tenant;
        3. advertising for creditors;
        4. determining validity of claims against the Estate;
        5. preparing financial statements and obtaining approval by the beneficiaries; and
        6. obtaining Releases signed by the beneficiaries releasing the executor of Administrator from liability.

Executors are personally liable to the beneficiaries for their dealings with the estate.

Regardless of how diligent or competent the Personal Representative is, estate law is complex.  Particularly if the estate involves blended families, estranged children, multiple beneficiaries, unusual or multiple assets, business interests, complex taxation issues, foreign property or beneficiaries, or minor beneficiaries, executors are well advised to retain an estate lawyer to advise them of the complexities and the law.   The legal fees are paid for by the estate and the lawyer’s assistance can streamline the process and provide assurances to the executor and beneficiaries that the estate is being handled in a proper, legal and efficient manner.

If you have questions about the probate process, for help determining whether probate will be needed, or help determining whether you should hire an estates lawyer, contact our office to arrange a consultation with an estates lawyer.

For more information, see our Fulton Wills & Estates Team page. We’re here to help.

Case Update: Adhering to Terms of an Invitation to Tender

In another in a long line of decisions dealing with the law of tendering, the BC Court of Appeal’s decision in Maglio Installations Ltd. v Castlegar (City) 2018 BCCA 80 reaffirms that local governments must strictly adhere to the terms of the invitation to tender in awarding the contract, or risk being successfully sued by a disappointed bidder.

The Facts

The case involved a tender for the construction of swimming ponds along the Columbia River in Castlegar. The City issued an invitation to tender that specified that construction was required to take place within specified work windows relating to fisheries and nesting birds. The invitation to tender specified that time was of the essence, and it required that bidders submit a preliminary construction schedule, or PCS, along with their bids. The invitation to tender also set out several milestone dates relating to the project.

The City amended the invitation to tender several times by pushing back the due date for submitting a bid and for project completion. The City also amended the milestone dates by replacing specific dates with such remarks as: “fall 2013 – final dates to be confirmed”.

The winning bidder did not submit a PCS with their bid, and instead remarked that a PCS would be submitted once final dates were confirmed and optional items were chosen. Another (unsuccessful) bidder provided a PCS. The two bids complied with the invitation to tender in all other respects.

The unsuccessful bidder successfully sued the City for breach of the invitation to tender (the “Contract A”) on the basis that the winning bidder’s failure to provide a PCS was a material breach of the Contract A, and that the City should have rejected their bid.

The City appealed the trial decision, on the basis that the failure to provide a PCS was not a material breach of Contract A, and that in any event, the failure to provide a PCS did not provide the winning bidder with a competitive advantage.

The Result

The Court of Appeal dismissed the City’s appeal. The Court upheld the trial judge’s finding that the inclusion of a PCS was a material element of the bid, remarking that the invitation to tender as a whole made it clear that timing was an essential part of the construction contract. For instance, the Court noted that an entire page of the invitation to tender was devoted to the PCS, and the environmental constraints in this case required that the successful bidder perform certain works within specified work windows.

For the trial judge these circumstances indicated that the construction scheduling was an important aspect of its assessment of the competing bids. The fact that the milestone dates were yet to be determined, and that the successful bidder had committed to meeting the milestone dates once determined, did not change the Court’s view that a PCS was a material element of the Contract A.

This decision affirms the established principles for determining whether a bid is compliant with the invitation to tender, namely:

  1. The parties enter into Contract A once a compliant bid is accepted;
  2. A discretion clause in the invitation to tender only allows the owner to forgive non-material defects;
  3. The test for substantial compliance is a two-part test:
    a. Did the bidder fail to include an important or essential requirement of the tender documents?
    b. Was there a substantial likelihood that the defect would have been significant to the owner’s decision making?
  4. If the invitation to tender requires the submission of certain information on its face and the tender documents indicate that the information is material, this provides prima facie proof of the
  5. importance of the information.
  6. At the second part of the two-part test, the court must consider the underlying rationale of the law of tendering, which is to effect fair competition and protect the integrity of the tendering process.

Googling a Potential Hire?

These days, personal information of others is often at your fingertips.

Googling or searching social media can give you a lot of insight into others – some of it truthful, some not. But, as an employer, are you allowed to search the internet for potential hires? Maybe, but be cautious.

Searching a person online and particularly their social media is considered to be a collection of personal information.

This is the case even if you just review the search and do not save or print it. Whether an employer is permitted to search a possible hire online is determined by what the purpose of the search is, and whether it is reasonable. Establishing an employment relationship is often sufficient to be considered reasonable.

However, while an employer does not need a potential hire’s consent to conduct an online search, privacy law requires an employer to give advanced notice that they intend to conduct a search and explain how the information can be used.

An employer’s online search of potential hires can present several privacy pitfalls for employers, some of which include:

  • An employer may be subjected to privacy complaints if they fail to give advanced notice of their intention to conduct an online search.
  • Collection of personal information must be reasonable and limited to what is necessary for the purpose for which it is collected. The nature of social media pages makes it nearly impossible to limit the collection of information to what is necessary to the employer’s purpose.
  • Employers also need to ensure that the information they collect is accurate, complete and current. Social media often presents an inaccurate or incomplete picture.
  • Finally, employers need to be aware of other legislation that can affect the decisions made after a social media check is conducted. For example, employers may face consequences under human rights legislation if a candidate is not hired after a social media check, and the check had revealed a characteristic of the candidate that falls under one of the protected grounds.

Questions? Contact Ayla Salyn or a member of our Workplace Law team.

We are here to navigate all your workplace needs.

Marihuana for Medical Purposes (MMPR)

Introduction

On June 10, 2013, the Federal Health Minister announced new regulations for the prescription, production, and dispersal of medical marihuana in Canada. The regulations were published in the Canadian Gazette and came into force on June 19, 2013. The new Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations (MMPR) will operate concurrently with the previous Marihuana for Medical Access Regulations (MMAR) until March 31, 2014, at which time the MMAR will be no longer be applicable.

These regulations, made pursuant to the Federal Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, may have considerable impact on local governments with concerns pertaining to the establishment of marihuana production facilities within their communities. It will also have an impact on local governments with existing medical marihuana licenses in their jurisdiction.

Legal Background

The Ontario Court of Appeal case of R v. Parker (2000) ruled that the prohibition against possession of marihuana for those with specific medical needs violated Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, an individual’s constitutional right to obtain marihuana for medical purposes is not without limits; the government must only ensure “reasonable access”. In 2001, the government responded by establishing the Medical Marihuana Access Regulations (MARR). The MMAR have undergone numerous changes as a result of both input from stakeholders and the courts. The cases of Sfetkopoulous v. Canada (2009) and R. v. Beren (2010) led to an increase in the number of production licenses a designated individual could obtain, and struck down the one-to-one producer to user ratio.

Under the existing system, it was estimated that over 50,000 individuals would be licensed to grow marijuana by 2014. These court decisions, combined with a greater concern for public health, safety and security, led to the new MMPR. During the 75-day consultation process after the proposed regulations were first announced on December 25, 2012, local governments, first responders, and police officers raised particular concerns about the fact that individuals were not required to inform local authorities about their intent to produce medical marihuana.

The Proposed Changes

The proposed MMPR is part of an attempt to address the health, safety and security issues of the existing system. The most significant change is the abolishment of Personal Use Production Licenses (PUPL) and Designated Person Production Licenses (DPPL) in favour of for-profit production facilities. As well, the proposed regulations eliminate the specific classes of individuals who were permitted to possess marihuana, and would allow any individual with a prescription from a doctor or authorized health practitioner to obtain a commercially available strain of medical marihuana. The Federal Government will no longer process applications, issue authorizations, or supply medical marihuana. It is expected that this may result in the creation of an entirely new industry, which may or may not be attractive to some local governments.

Under the new MMPR, a potential producer must obtain a license from the Minister and comply with all requirements. Licenses are valid for no more than three years, and may be renewed and amended upon further application. Important aspects of the MMPR include:

  • written notice to local governments informing the location of production and storage facilities;
  • production will be prohibited in dwellings;
  • production and storage activities must take place indoors;
  • requirements for security measures, site monitoring, and security clearances;
  • compliance with all production, packaging, labeling, and shipping standards;
  • registration of all clients with applicable medical documents; and
  • delivery of medical marihuana by mail only.

Importantly, the new MMPR does not include any restrictions on the ability of Local Governments to regulate marihuana production through zoning bylaws or any other regulatory authority.

Impact on Local Governments and Zoning Bylaws

When considering local regulations, the following are some of the key impacts of the new MMPR:

  1. Prior to applying for a new or amended license, as well as after any issuance or renewal, a licensed producer must provide written notices to senior officials of the local government, which includes: an incorporated or unincorporated city, metropolitan area, town, village, municipality, and bands defined under the Indian Act (or self-government agreement).
  2. There is no reason to assume that a licensed producer will be immune from relevant bylaws and zoning restrictions. Local governments have the authority to regulate these activities and should be able to prohibit production in certain areas, as long as there is not a complete ban and the restrictions can be read in “harmony” with the MMPR. When combined with “shipping-only” delivery, it is unlikely that zoning restrictions will infringe on an individual’s rights to “reasonable access”. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that local governments have the authority to implement bylaws and zoning restrictions that increase the stringency of Federal regulations, so long as individuals can comply with both laws at the same time (114957 Canada LtĂ©e v. Hudson, 2001).
  3. Prior to the new MMPR, disclosure of the location of PUPL’s or DPPL’s to local authorities was contrary to the Privacy Act, creating further regulatory and policing challenges. While this information is still protected, new provisions in the MMPR require communication to the Minister of the location of PUPL’s and DPPL’s that are intending to sell remaining seeds, plants, and “dried marihuana” to licensed producers. This information may be available to local governments, assisting in their ability to regulate and police the transition from the MMAR to the MMPR.
  4. It will be left to the discretion of a particular local government as to whether or not they will create specific bylaws governing licensed producers. Local authorities will have to evaluate the social, security, and administrative impacts of production facilities within their jurisdictions.

Future Challenges for Local Governments

In addition to the unique health, safety, and security issues created by the new regulations, the following are additional legal and administrative challenges that may arise under the MMPR:

The future extraction of alternative products and chemicals from marihuana may create additional health, safety, and security risks moving forward. Under the new MMPR, licensed producers can only sell or provide “dried marihuana”. The same requirement existed under the previous MMAR; however, the BC Supreme Court decision of R v. Smith (2012) ruled that this restriction violated Section 7 of the Charter. At this juncture, R v. Smith has not been considered by the BC Court of Appeal, but to date the prohibition is of no force and effect in BC.

It also remains to be seen whether non-residential zoning restrictions or complete bans will frustrate the purpose of the new MMPR. As long as there are enough production facilities in operation allowing individuals to access medical marihuana via mail, it is possible that complete bans in certain jurisdictions may not violate the constitutional right to “reasonable access” of medical marihuana.

Under the new regime, Health Canada will only inspect for compliance under the MMPR; it is the responsibility of local governments to inspect for compliance under local bylaws and regulations. Concerns of local governments over production facilities will have to be dealt with between the local government and the licensed producer. Health Canada has not stated whether they will inspect individuals with invalid licenses under the MMAR.

Under the Community Charter, local governments have the power to regulate businesses through licensing and may wish to use bylaws to require producers to obtain licenses in addition to those under the MMPR. However, the local government would still be responsible for enforcing any such licensing scheme.

The added health and security risks associated with marihuana production facilities may increase costs to neighbouring businesses and/or residential areas. It may also negatively affect the fair market value of such premises.

Further Information:

The MMPR was published in the Canadian Gazette on June 19, 2013. Further information is also available on the Health Canada website HERE.

A Timeline for First-Time Home Buyers: Your Essential Guide

Buying your first home is an exciting and significant milestone. The process can be complex, but understanding the timeline can help you navigate it with confidence. Here’s a general overview of the journey from planning to moving in.

Months 1-2: Financial Preparation

Start by evaluating your finances, including savings, income, and expenses. Check your credit score and work on improving it if necessary. Establish a realistic budget for your home purchase, accounting for the down payment, closing costs, and moving expenses. Approach lenders to get pre-approved for a mortgage, giving you a clear idea of your buying power.

Months 2-3: Starting the Search

Choose a reputable real estate agent who understands your needs. Begin your house hunt, focusing on properties that fit your budget and preferences. Attend open houses to get a feel for different homes and neighborhoods. This phase is about narrowing down your options and finding a property that feels right.

Month 4: Making an Offer

Once you’ve found the perfect home, work with your real estate agent to submit a competitive offer. Be prepared for some negotiation with the seller on price and terms. This can be a tense but exciting time as you wait for your offer to be accepted.

Month 4: Conducting Due Diligence

After your offer is accepted, conduct due diligence. Hire a professional inspector to evaluate the property’s condition, and your lender may require an appraisal to ensure the property’s value matches the loan amount. Finalize your mortgage application during this period to secure financing.

Month 5: Subject Removal

Complete any subject conditions outlined in your purchase contract, such as securing financing, obtaining insurance, and conducting inspections. Once these conditions are met, formally remove the subjects to confirm your purchase.

Month 6: Preparing for Closing

Prepare for the closing process by reviewing the necessary documents, which your lawyer will prepare. Many documents can only be signed in person, so make sure your lawyer is aware of your travel plans or out-of-town work schedule. Ensure you have the down payment and closing costs ready. Tip, if you are withdrawing funds from your RRSPs or other investments this can take time to facilitate. Start the process early to ensure no issues at closing. Conduct a final walkthrough of the property to confirm it’s in the agreed-upon condition.

Month 6: Closing Day

On or just before closing day, sign all required documents, including the mortgage agreement and title transfer documents. Your lender will provide the loan proceeds to your lawyer. Your lawyer will register the transfer and deliver the sale proceeds to the seller’s lawyer, and you’ll receive the keys to your new home, officially taking possession.

If you need have any questions about these key dates, our Real Estate Law team is here to help.

Terms of Use

Terms of Use

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Sport Law

Protecting your game, every step of the way.

With multiple former national team athletes among our lawyers, we understand the passion and dedication it takes to excel in the world of sports. Whether you’re a sports organization, athlete, team, or league, navigating the legal complexities of the sport industry can be daunting.

That’s where we come in.

Our team of experienced sports law professionals

is here to safeguard your interests, ensuring you can focus on what you do best – competing and winning. From policy development and implementation, to SafeSport, to dispute resolution and anti-doping matters, we offer comprehensive legal solutions tailored to your unique needs.

Safeguarding Rights: A Proactive Guide for Employers on Navigating Discrimination Claims

If an employer is made aware of discrimination claims, they must take the appropriate steps to address the situation seriously.

Failure to follow procedures set out by the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal (BCHRT), and mishandling discrimination claims could result in lengthy and costly legal proceedings, potentially disrupting the workplace and damaging relationships. Most importantly, to reduce claims brought to the BCHRT, employers need to be respectful and supportive throughout the process.

What Employers Should Do?

If an employee raises a complaint of discrimination in the workplace, an employer needs to follow three main principles:

  1. Act promptly. The BCHRT has outlined guiding principles that employers should meet.
  2. Take the claim seriously and conduct an appropriate investigation.
  3. If the claim objectively has merit, the employer must address the claim, its impact, and take concrete steps to ensure that the discrimination does not continue. You may need to seek the opinion of an independent third party, such as a lawyer, to determine if there is objective merit.

When employers follow these principles, they not only resolve the issues effectively, but also mitigate liability if the employee files a human rights claim. If the employer can prove that they have met these principles in a manner that aligns with the BCHRT’s guidelines, it is possible that the BCHRT will exercise its discretion to dismiss the claim against the employer.

Best Practices

For employers to satisfy these requirements, the BCHRT emphasizes that the standard is not perfection, but rather ‘reasonableness’. Employers must also recognize that although there are guiding principles on how to respond, each claim is unique, and a one-size-fits-all approach will not suffice.

For an employer to meet these requirements, they should evaluate whether an objective observer would deem their actions as reasonable in response to the claims made of discrimination. For example, in the recent BCHRT case of Salanguit v. Parq Vancouver and another, 2024 BCHRT 119, an employee filed a claim of workplace discrimination against their employer. In response, the employer provided evidence that they conducted the investigation within a few days of being aware of the complaint, offered the employee counseling resources, and accommodated them during their medical leave. Furthermore, when the investigation revealed wrongdoing by another employee, that employee was disciplined, and a settlement was offered to the discriminated employee. The settlement was a reasonable amount that the employee could have expected to receive if their BCHRT claim was ultimately successful. The tribunal concluded that the employer’s response satisfied the principles that the BCHRT set out, leading to the dismissal of the claim on the grounds that proceeding further would not advance the purpose of the BC Human Rights Code.

Putting this into practice requires employers to:
  1. Have a policy that outlines a reasonable procedure for handling discrimination complaints.
  2. Document their entire process when addressing a complaint. This documentation will serve as evidence if a claim is brought and can also be referenced to guide future claims.
  3. Review their investigation findings and revise policies and procedures to help prevent future discrimination.

Employers should take claims of discrimination seriously. Failure to properly respond and handle these claims can lead to further legal consequences. Employers need to respond promptly and complete investigations in a timely manner. If wrongdoing is found, they should acknowledge and address the discriminatory conduct, and take steps to reduce and mitigate future claims. For more information on this topic, contact our Workplace Law team. We’re here to help.

Dangers of the “Back of the Napkin” Will

The laws in British Columbia regarding wills changed dramatically in March of 2014, when the new Wills, Estates and Succession Act (“WESA”) came into force. One of the most significant changes is in section 58 of WESA.

Prior to section 58, the law recognized as valid only those wills that were executed in perfect compliance with the various requirements, including that two witnesses be present when the testator signs the will, etc
. There was no room for the Court to declare a will to be valid that did not comply with all the requirements, even where it was clear that the person making the document intended it to be his or her final will.

Section 58 of WESA now permits the Court to fix or cure technical defects in testamentary documents (i.e. documents that appear to be “will-like” in nature).

This new power will have a significant (and welcome) impact where the circumstances make it clear that the will-maker intended to make a new will, but some hiccup in the process (such as a witness wandering out of the room at the wrong time) resulted in the will being technically invalid. In those cases, we expect that the Courts will now forgive the technical defect and uphold the document as a valid will.

In more ambiguous circumstances, however, the curative powers of section 58 may complicate the probate process. The classic situation is where a person jots down an informal will on the back of a napkin. In the digital age, however, the potential for these types of wills is endless – text messages, emails, draft “new wills” saved on a computer or smart phone, and so on.

Because of section 58, the executor of that person’s estate will now have to search for and bring to the attention of the Court such text messages, electronic documents, or notes, and perhaps have a full hearing in front of a judge, leading to considerable extra cost.

Legal and financial professionals should be aware of section 58 of WESA and advise their clients to be very careful about creating any documentation that tends to alter what is in their existing wills. If they do wish to make a “draft” new will or something along those lines, it is paramount that they make their intentions 100% clear – scrawl “DRAFT” on every page if it is still a draft, and get it properly witnessed if it is now a finished product.

New Provincial Short-Term Rental Legislation

Introduction

On October 16, 2023, the Province announced new legislation regarding short-term rentals: The Short-Term Rental Accommodations Act. This Act was brought into force on October 26, 2023. This new legislation establishes minimum requirements for local governments, which may choose to enact further restrictions.

Importantly, this new legislation does not apply to communities on First Nations reserve land nor hotels/motels. Modern treaty nations are also exempt, but can opt in to the legislation if they wish.

The new legislation focuses on three key goals:

  1. Increasing fines and strengthening tools for local governments;
  2. Returning more short-term rentals to long-term homes; and
  3. Establishing provincial rules and enforcement mechanisms.

The new legislation will be implemented in Phases.

Phase 1 – Increasing Fines and Tools for LGs

  • The Province has announced its intention to increase the fines that can be levied under the Municipal Ticket Information System, from $1,000 to $3,000 (per infraction, per day). However, it is unclear when this amendment will occur.
  • The Local Government Act was amended to increase the maximum penalty that can be levied by regional districts from a maximum of $2,000 to a maximum of $50,000 for prosecutions under the Offence Act.
  • Regional Districts now have the ability to issue business licenses to regulate short-term rentals in rural areas.

Phase 2 – Returning Short-term Rentals to Long-term Homes

  • Beginning May 1, 2024, short-term rentals will only be allowed in hosts’ principal residence.
  • However, this principal residence requirement does not apply in:
    • most municipalities under 10,000 people (except those immediately adjacent to larger municipalities with 10,000 + people);
    • all Regional Districts; and
    • the 14 resort communities and mountain resort areas (e.g., Whistler, Sun Peaks etc.).
  • Beginning on May 1, 2024, short-term rental platforms will be required to enable the display of local government business license numbers. Platforms will be required to remove a host’s listing within a few days when there is no valid local government business license in place.
  • The Local Government Act will be amended so that legal non-conforming use protections will not apply to short-term rentals. This amendment will be done by regulation of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, but it is unclear when this amendment will occur.
  • By summer 2024, short-term rental platforms (e.g., Airbnb, VRBO) will be required to provide certain data to the Province. This data will be shared with local governments to help them enforce compliance.

Phase 3 – Establishing Provincial Rules and Enforcement Mechanisms

  • By late 2024, the Province will create a Provincial Host and Platform Registry.
  • Once the registry is established, all hosts and platforms will be required to register and listings will need to include both the local government business license number and the provincial registration number.
  • The Province will create a short-term rental compliance and enforcement unit to ensure the rules are being followed.

Questions?

Contact a member of our experienced Local Government team – we’re here to help!

 

DOWNLOAD ARTICLE PDF HERE

Workplace Investigations Conference

Thompson Rivers University, Fulton, and the Association of Workplace Investigators proudly present a two-day “Workplace Investigations in Canada: Current Issues and Future Directions” conference on current issues and future directions in workplace investigations in Canada.

Taking place over May 30-31, 2024, at Thompson Rivers University Faculty of Law’s award-winning facility, this event brings together employers, practitioners, employment lawyers, government officials, academics, human resource professionals, and others who are interested in the practice and theory of workplace investigations, providing a unique opportunity to share and gather insights, while networking with other stakeholders.

“In recent years, workplace investigations have become a major tool of employment law and regulation,” says Matt Malone, TRU law faculty member and author of We Have Received a Complaint: The Fraught World of Workplace Justice.

“As workers become more aware of their rights in the workplace, and as more employers use investigations to mitigate and address potential liability, workplace investigations have become an important tool to ensure workplaces meet required legal standards.

“This conference hopes to identify and discuss current issues and future directions in the field, taking up issues like threshold assessments, what constitutes conduct ‘in the workplace,’ appeals of investigations, anonymous complainants and issues of bias and equity, as well as the international perspective and investigations in contexts like sports. The conference will present a first-of-its-kind opportunity for stakeholders in the field. We hope it will become the first in a series of conferences on workplace investigations in Canada.”

Please note, this is a not-for-profit event. Any remaining funds will be used to support TRU Law Students. 

New Emergency and Disaster Management Act

Introduction

On October 4, 2023, the Province announced new emergency management legislation: the Emergency and Disaster Management Act. On November 8, 2023, this Act was given royal assent and brought into force, replacing the Emergency Program Act (“EPA”).

This new Act places many new and enhanced responsibilities on local governments and changes the powers available to local governments during emergencies. Below is a summary of some of the changes:

1. Expanded Definition of “Emergency”

Similar to the EPA, the definition of “emergency” refers to conditions that may be imminent, ongoing, or that have occurred, and that require a prompt coordination of action or special regulation of persons or property. However, the new definition is expanded to expressly speak to transmissible diseases, environmental toxins, rioting, security threats, and terrorist activity. The definition also includes impacts to objects/sites of heritage value when those objects/sites require protection from these types of hazardous events.

2. Changes to States of Local Emergency (“SOLE”) and Introduction of Local Recovery Periods

Under the EPA, once declared, a SOLE lasts for seven days. Under the new legislation, a SOLE lasts for 14 days before it must be extended.

The new Act authorizes local governments, with written approval of the Minister, to declare a renewable 90-day “recovery period” once a SOLE is cancelled. This recovery period authorizes the use of certain powers under the new legislation (e.g., preventing people from entering an area, prohibiting travel) once the response phase ends.

Certain SOLE powers under the EPA have been removed – local governments no longer have the power to “do all acts necessary” in the event of an emergency. Instead, the new Act prescribes various powers available to local governments during a SOLE or recovery period. These powers include, among others:

  • the power to identify essential goods, services, property, or facilities and, in relation to those things, establish price controls, ration or provide for their distribution or use, or provide for their restoration;
  • require a qualified person to provide a service or give assistance;
  • appropriate, use, or control the use of goods;
  • use or control the use of land;
  • authorize entry into structures or onto land to take emergency measures;
  • prohibit entry into structures or onto land so that emergency measures can be taken;
  • authorize or require alterations, removal, or demolition of trees, crops, structures, or landscapes;
  • require the evacuation of persons or authorize the evacuation of persons or animals;
  • control or prohibit travel; and
  • control or prohibit business activities.

3. Consultation Requirements

The new Act recognizes that the inherent right of self-governing Indigenous Peoples includes law-making authority in relation to emergency management. Consistent with the rights in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, the new Act requires local governments to consult and cooperate with neighbouring Indigenous governing bodies during all phases of emergency management. The new Act also enables local governments to enter into different types of agreements with Indigenous governing bodies to coordinate emergency management activities.

4. Expanded Risk Assessment, Planning, and Reporting Requirements

Under the new legislation, local governments are required to prepare risk assessments for all reasonably foreseeable hazards within their jurisdictions. The risk assessments must, among other things, identify all hazards and evaluate the degree of risk related to each hazard, as well as potential consequences for people, animals, places, and others who may be disproportionately impacted by disasters or emergencies. Climate change will be a consideration in these assessments.

Local governments are also required to have emergency management plans that address all four phases of emergency management (preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery). These plans must ensure that the local government continues to function, and essential services can be delivered during an emergency. These plans must also consider Indigenous knowledge, climate change and its impacts on people, animals, places, and others who may be disproportionately impacted by disasters and emergencies.

Local governments are also required to prepare thorough reports following the expiry/cancellation of a SOLE or local recovery period. The Province may also request that a local government prepare a report on any relevant matter, as determined by the Minister of Emergency Management and Climate Readiness.

Questions?

Contact a member of our experienced Local Government team – we’re here to help!

 

DOWNLOAD ARTICLE PDF HERE

Land Owner Transparency Registry

Retroactive Disclosure

Background

In an ongoing attempt to curb money-laundering, tax evasion and hidden property ownership, the BC provincial government introduced the Land Owner Transparency Act (“LOTA”) and Land Owner Transparency Registry (“LOTR”), which came into force on November 30, 2020.

With the introduction of LOTA and LOTR, there are now requirements to file a transparency declaration disclosing “interest holders” and a subsequent report if the holder of an “interest in land” is a “reporting body”. These declarations and, if applicable, reports, must accompany every registration for the transfer of land at the Land Title Office, as well as other registrations relating to “interests in land”.

Further, on or before November 30, 2022, “reporting bodies” will need to file a retroactive Land Owner Transparency Report disclosing all “interest holders” with “interests in land” for any pre-existing real property holdings, with limited exceptions. This will affect most corporate interest holders who hold a beneficial or indirect interest in land through corporate ownership.

This deadline should not be overlooked, as the potential fines and penalties for failing to file the transparency report are significant. Individuals may be liable for fines of up to $25,000 and reporting bodies, for fines of up to $50,000. Additional fines of up to $100,000 may be imposed for other offences under LOTA.

LOTA Breakdown

What is an “interest in land”?

An ”interest in land” pursuant to LOTA includes:

  • fee simple estates;
  • life estates;
  • leases with a remaining term greater than 10 years;
  • a right to occupy or require a transfer of land under an agreement for sale; and
  • other prescribed real property interests.

What is a “reporting body”?

Under LOTA, a reporting body is a:

  • “relevant corporation”, which includes privately held corporations or limited liability companies, including incorporated associations and societies; but excludes entities specifically exempt under Schedule 1 of LOTA (e.g., strata and public corporations);
  • “relevant trust”, being express trusts, bare trusts or a similar legal relationship created in another jurisdiction, but excluding those trusts specifically exempt under Schedule 2 of LOTA; or
  • “relevant partnership”, which includes general partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships, professional partnerships or foreign partnerships within the meaning of the BC Partnership Act or a similar legal relationship created under another jurisdiction.

Who/what are “interest holders”?

The ultimate purpose of LOTA is to identify the individual(s) with an interest in land. More specifically, the individual(s) who holds the beneficial interest in land or has prescribed rights in relation to the land through a reporting body. LOTA breaks interest holders into three categories: corporate interest holders; partnership interest holders; and beneficial owners.

Corporate Interest Holders:

Under LOTA, corporate interest holders are individuals that:

  • directly or indirectly own, or indirectly control:
    1. 10% or more of the shares or equity in the relevant corporation; or
    2. shares of the relevant corporation that carry 10% or more of the voting rights at general meetings; or
  • have the right that if exercised, would result in the election, appointment or removal or the majority of the directors of the relevant corporation.
Partnership Interest Holders:

When an interest in land is partnership property, under LOTA partnership interest holders are presumed to be individuals that are:

  • partners in a relevant corporation; or
  • corporate interest holders of a relevant corporation that are partners in a relevant corporation;

in each case, either directly or indirectly through a chain of relevant partnerships.

Beneficial Interest Holders:

Under LOTA, a beneficial interest holder is an individual that:

  • has a beneficial interest in land that is not contingent on the death of another individual, registered in the name of the trustee of the relevant trust; or
  • has the power to revoke the relevant trust and receive an interest in land;

in each case, either directly or as a corporate interest holder of a relevant corporation with such rights.

What information is disclosed in the report?

The LOTR is a publicly accessible registry. Any person can search an individual’s name or a parcel identifier (PID) to determine an individual’s various interests in land in the case of a name search, or beneficial ownership in land in the case of a PID search. This is achieved by filing the above noted declaration and report, as applicable.

Each report must include “primary identification information”. For individual interest holders this disclosure (which is publicly available) includes:

  • the individual’s full name;
  • whether or not the individual is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident of Canada;
  • if the individual is not a Canadian citizen or permanent resident of Canada, every country or state of which the individual is a citizen;
  • if the individual’s principal residence is in Canada, the city and province in which that principal residence is located; and
  • if the individual’s principal residence is outside Canada, the city and country in which that principal residence is located.

Other non-public disclosure requirements include date of birth, SIN or individual tax number, and a description of how the individual is an interest holder.

There are additional disclosure requirements for relevant corporations, relevant trusts and relevant partnerships.

Takeaways for our Clients

If you are an “interest holder” in a “reporting body” you should confirm if a transparency report needs to be filed for your relevant corporation, partnership or trust before the November 30, 2022 deadline. LOTA is complex and relatively new legislation, with potentially significant consequences for non-compliance. As a result, consulting a legal professional to assist in preparing your transparency report is advisable. If you have questions or would like assistance in meeting these disclosure requirements, we encourage you to reach out to Sam Dabner, Casey Helgason or any member of our business law team.

We’re here to help.

Tendering Law and analysis of “substantial compliance”

True Construction Ltd. v Kamloops (City), 2016 BCCA 173

Introduction

On April 21, 2016, The British Columbia Court of Appeal released the decision True Construction Ltd. v Kamloops (City), 2016 BCCA 173 (“True”), upholding the earlier decision of the BC Supreme Court. The litigation dealt primarily with the effect of non-compliance with bidding instructions by a bidder, and which errors amount to a bid which is legally “incapable of acceptance” due to being substantially non-compliant with the instructions.

In its tender offer, the City had used standard form instructions which required Appendix ‘A’ (which was to list subcontractors) to be submitted as part of the bid package. The question was whether this Appendix had to be included with the original sealed bid form, or whether it could be omitted until later on and faxed in as part of a bid amendment. Later faxed revisions, in general, were allowed by the bid instructions. The Court of Appeal found that Appendix ‘A’ was a part of the Bid Form and as such had to be submitted with the original sealed bid. Furthermore, the Court held that the defect in not including it made the bid substantially non-compliant and therefore “incapable of acceptance” at law. It also created a risk of a competitive advantage for True Construction over other bidders as it provided the opportunity to negotiate subcontractor pricing for longer without the risk that others bidders faced.

This recent decision does not impact the current state of the law in a significant way, but does shed further light on the definition of substantially non-compliant bids and competitive advantage in the bidding process. The Court of Appeal also made sure to note that it is not necessary that a bidder in fact gained and utilized a competitive advantage created by a non-compliant bid to disqualify it. It is enough that the non-compliant bid creates an objective opportunity for a competitive advantage from the point of view of other bidders.

Factual Background

In September 2010, the City of Kamloops issued an invitation to tender for the Aberdeen Fire Hall. This invitation included instructions which required bidders to place a completed Bid Form in a sealed envelope and deliver it to the City, and that faxed bids would not be accepted. However, bidders could revise bids by fax using an Appendix ‘F’, including revising the list of subcontractors and subcontractor pricing.

The bid closing was set for 2:00pm on November 3, 2010. True submitted its bid form on November 2nd at 3:18pm, but did not include the two pages of Appendix ‘A’ which listed subcontractors not bid through the bid depository system. Appendix ‘A’ had not been included on purpose as True Construction wanted to postpone selecting subcontractors until they had received all of their pricing. They then submitted the missing portion on November 3rd at 1:38pm.

True had the lowest bid at closing by approximately $150,000, but the City chose to disqualify their bid as their opinion was that choosing their bid would damage its reputation and ability to contract quality bidders for future projects. The main reason they held this opinion was that subcontractor pricing made up a large portion of the work on the project, and by deferring the inclusion of subcontractor pricing True had a greater opportunity to gain lower prices from subcontractors to include in their bid, but if unsuccessful did not have a completed bid and so could argue that they did not have to perform the contract. While other bidders could also continue to negotiate with subcontractors and reduce their price through faxed revision, they did this at the risk of being unsuccessful in gaining lower pricing or otherwise failing to fax in their revision and would then be bound by their original bid. Alternatively, other bidders could wait until the last minute to deliver their sealed bid including negotiated subcontractor pricing, but at the risk that they would not be able to make the delivery in time and miss the deadline altogether, without any obligation on the City to even review and consider their bid.

The City chose the second lowest bidder, Tri-City, which also had an irregularity in their bid. Their faxed revision (which had increased their bid price by $122,600) came in 11 minutes before it had hand delivered its completed sealed bid, and the City decided that they were entitled to waive this error given that their standard form documents contained a “discretion” clause allowing it to waive irregularities that were technical in nature.

Decision of the Court of Appeal

The unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal to dismiss True Construction’s appeal rested on two questions: did Appendix ‘A’ form part of the Bid Form which needed to be included in the original sealed bid, and did the failure to include it in the Bid Form create the objective opportunity to gain a competitive advantage in the bidding process.

The first question was important as that would decide whether there was a completed bid “capable of acceptance at law.” If there is no completed bid, there is no legal relationship established between the parties. As the invitation to tender included a “discretion clause” entitling the City to take into account more factors than just price in deciding to award a tender contract, the threshold of whether a bid is capable of acceptance is “material non-compliance.”

True Construction argued that its bid in the sealed envelope was capable of acceptance without Appendix ‘A’ as the Instructions to Bidders did not clearly stipulate that it had to be included. Alternatively, they argued that all that mattered was that all the necessary information was included as of the time of closing and that the total price was in the sealed bid.

The Court of Appeal held that when all the tender documents were read in their entirety, Appendix A formed part of the Bid Form. There was a clause in the tender documents dealing with subcontractors which referenced applicable British Columbia Construction Association Bid Depository Rules of Procedure and how they applied to certain sub-trades “As per Appendix A of the Bid Form.” This was found to be a clear and unambiguous identification of Appendix A as being part of the Bid Form, and the fact that bidders were required to “
list the name of a Subcontractor on the Bid Form” (of which there was only a place to do so on Appendix ‘A’) further strengthened this conclusion. This interpretation was found to be consistent with expectations of tendering, which generally is a stringent and formal process.

As Appendix ‘A’ was a part of the Bid Form, the question then became whether the bid was “substantially compliant” notwithstanding the failure to include it. Given that a discretion clause was included in the tender documents, whether the bid was substantially non-compliant depended on whether True gained a competitive advantage from its non-compliant method of completing its bid. In the circumstances, the requirement that a bidder lists its proposed subcontractors fulfilled a material purpose as it formed one of the bases upon which the City could choose to accept or reject a bid. The City could and would consider which subcontractors were listed as the Invitation to Bid said that the City could reject a bid based on the bidder’s “bid price, qualifications, previous experience on similar work, and ability to meet schedule.” Given that much of the work on the project was to be completed by subcontractors, the choice of subcontractors was clearly relevant to these factors and the evaluation of whether a bid contract would be awarded.

The Court of Appeal held that when tender documents require certain information which is omitted or erroneous, it is the party seeking to establish that the required information is merely minor or technical in nature that must provide evidence demonstrating its why the information is immaterial. Put in another way, there is no presumption that a failure to comply with tender instructions represents only a minor or technical error. There was no such evidence of immateriality put forward in this case.

The last question the Court of Appeal dealt with was whether the substantially non-compliant bid could be later “cured’ by faxing Appendix ‘A’ before the deadline. This was held to not be possible due to the objective competitive advantage derived from the manner in which True submitted its bid. It gained an opportunity to potentially walk away from its bid if it did not negotiate favourable subcontractor pricing which was not an option available to other bidders.

Implications for Local Governments

In many projects which go out for tender, work to be completed by subcontractors forms a major component. It is logical then that a Local Government should be able to take the selection of subcontractors into account when awarding a bid contract. The Court of Appeal explicitly held this to be a valid consideration when subcontractor pricing is an important aspect of the project and a “privilege clause” is present in the tender documents which allows the Local Government to consider more factors than just price.

The case also highlights the importance of the words found in the Invitation to Tender. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal relied heavily on the words found in the contract to determine whether True’s irregularity was minor or substantial in nature, and whether Appendix ‘A’ was part of the bid form. Although there are many considerations at play in lawsuits dealing with the tendering process, at the heart of the issues is often contractual interpretation. It is advisable that Local Governments take due care and attention in preparing tender documents to ensure that the instructions are as clear as possible to minimize the risk of litigation.

There is a lesson to be learned by proponents submitting bids as well. If a requirement in the tender instructions appears to be unclear, then the safest course of action is to seek clarification prior to submitting a bid. Addenda are often issued by the owner for this very purpose. This way, the manner in which a submitted bid will be evaluated is more predictable and proponents can focus their resources on submitting a bid which will be evaluated on its merits without any complicating factors.

Good Reasons for Disinheriting a Family Member?

In a recent court case in BC, a factually untrue, written explanation by a Will-maker for disinheriting a family member proved inaccurate and was ultimately ignored by the Court.

We have previously discussed Wills Variation generally  but to briefly summarize, in BC, biological children and spouses have the right to challenge a Will, asking the court to grant them a greater share of the estate, on the basis that the Will made inadequate provision for them.

In this bulletin, we address two specific questions clients often ask us about the variation of Wills:

  • “Do my reasons for disinheriting this person matter?”
  • “Is it a good idea to write down my reasons for disinheriting this person?”

Lawyers often recommend such a “Wills Variation Memorandum” (which we refer to as a “Memo”), because, if done correctly, a Memo can be an effective means by which the Will-maker can tell their story “from the grave”.

There are four key things to know about such Memos:

Memos are Not Essential

The Courts can uphold a disinheritance even if there is no written explanation, if there is other evidence to show that the Will-maker had sufficient grounds for the disinheritance. For instance, if there was family testimony or bank records to demonstrate that the disinherited child had already received substantial assets from the Will-maker before the Will-maker died, then the disinheritance would likely be upheld – this being the case despite that there was no direct evidence (such as a written memo) from the Will-maker.

Memos May be Helpful

The Memo is helpful to demonstrate that the reasons for disinheritance are valid and reasonable, and to draw attention to a justification that might otherwise be forgotten. If the parent knows, for example, that his/her other children are unaware of past financial assistance given to the disinherited child, the parent could draw attention to this in a Memo.

Memos May be Ignored

A Memo can, however, be disregarded by the Court. The general rule is that the justification must be “valid and rational” to be considered by the Court. If it is not, the Court will likely not acknowledge the reasons given by the Will-maker, as happened in the recent case of Sharma v Sharma Estate 2016 BCSC 1397, where the justification given in that Memo was factually inaccurate.

In that case, the Will-maker made a Memo declaring that the disinheritance of two of the Will-maker’s three children was because they had already received “plenty of monies” during the Will-makers lifetime, while the third child had not.

The Court found that that Memo was factually incorrect. The third child had in fact received significant financial assistance from the Will-maker, while the two disinherited children had not received as much – and one of them had received nothing at all. As a result, the Court deemed the Memo invalid and disregarded it, reversed the disinheritance of the two children, and eventually split the Estate more or less evenly between the three children.

Memos May be Counterproductive

Sometimes, a Memo can be counterproductive because it may make the Court more, rather than less, likely to vary the Will. For instance, consider the scenario where the parent has several justifications for disinheritance, but only includes one of the justifications in his or her Memo. If it turns out that the sole reason in the Memo is not factually accurate, then the Court may ignore all of the other, potentially valid justifications, on the basis that “if the parent had considered these as factors as justifying a disinheritance, the parent would have mentioned those factors in the Memo”. In that sense, it is possible that making an incomplete Memo may be worse than making no Memo at all!

Conclusion

A Wills Variation memorandum can be a useful tool to explain and justify a disinheritance. However, it is not always necessary and, if not properly done, could even end up being counterproductive. If a Will-maker is considering a disinheritance, he or she should obtain advice from an experienced estate lawyer, and make sure that any Memo produced is accurate and comprehensive. In addition, it is important to update the Will, and/or the Memo, whenever circumstances change.

Joint Tenancy – Best Practices to Avoid Disputes

Since 2007 and the ground-breaking Supreme Court of Canada case of Pecore v. Pecore (“Pecore”), the Courts have decided many cases concerning assets held in joint tenancy, and have had a chance to “work through” some of the nuances and legal challenges presented in Pecore.

This article is intended for those professionals who are interested in learning more about the legal challenges presented by joint tenancy ownership. With a greater understanding of the challenges, we can help protect our clients, and their estates, from being the subject of Pecore-style litigation.

In particular, we will address the following issues:

  1. Effect of the Pecore decision on joint tenancies;
  2. Documenting intention at the time of transfer;
  3. Documenting intention after the transfer;
  4. Unexpected severance of joint tenancies;
  5. Exposure of asset to creditors/claimants;
  6. Tax treatment of jointly held assets; and
  7. Ineffectiveness in attempting to avoid probate.

1. Effect of Pecore on Joint Tenancies

The Pecore decision changed the legal framework of how certain joint tenancies are treated. In particular, the decision focussed on gratuitous (i.e., given for free) transfers between a parent and an adult child, including transfers into joint tenancy. Post Pecore , it is no longer the case that simply putting an asset into “Joint With Right Of Survivorship” ownership status will ensure that the asset will pass to the surviving joint owner upon death of the original owner.

In fact, unless there is clear evidence to prove that the transferor (for this paper, we will refer to the transferor as the “parent”) intended the surviving joint owner (the child) to receive the asset, it will be considered part of the parent’s estate upon the parent’s death, and not the property of the surviving child. This is called the “presumption of resulting trust” and applies to all sorts of property, whether bank accounts, investments or land.[1]

As a result, where the intention of creating joint ownership is to gift the asset upon death, that intention should be clearly documented, in order to rebut the presumption that would otherwise mandate the opposite result. This is where legal and financial advisors can play a key role in reducing the chance of a dispute over the asset once the parent has passed away.

2. Documenting Intention at the Time of Transfer

A legal advisor should be consulted prior to the transfer of an asset into joint names to ensure that the client’s intentions are clearly documented – either: 1) by way of letter or deed confirming a gift; or 2) by way of trust declaration confirming that the asset is not being gifted to the surviving joint owner, but instead is to be held in trust (often with the goal of probate avoidance) arrangement.

The Pecore decision highlighted the distinction between legal ownership vs. beneficial ownership. This distinction can be thought of as the difference between “who is on title” (legal ownership) vs. “who is the real owner” (beneficial ownership). Transfer of an asset into joint tenancy is a transfer of legal title to the asset, but as Pecore emphasized, may not be a transfer of beneficial ownership.

Instead, there could be as many as four possible intentions/outcomes with respect to the beneficial ownership of a jointly-owned asset:

  • True trust, where both legal ownership and beneficial ownership are held in trust for the parent during the parent’s lifetime and, after death, for the parent’s estate and its beneficiaries (this is the scenario presumed by the presumption of resulting trust from Pecore , and is the default position if there is no evidence to the contrary).

Example: elderly mother adds her son to her bank accounts, so that the son can assist her with banking and managing finances, purely for convenience. When mother dies, she expects son to pay mother’s funeral and other bills, and then divide what remains equally among all the children, in the same manner as her Will distributes her other assets. In this example, the son holds money as a trustee, in trust for mother’s estate.

  • Gift of the right of survivorship only, meaning that the child only holds bare legal title in trust for the parent until the parent’s death. The child’s beneficial ownership is delayed until the parent’s death, at which time the child takes full beneficial ownership by way of survivorship.

Example: elderly mother adds her son to her bank accounts, so that the son can assist her with banking and managing finances, purely for convenience during mother’s lifetime. But, when the mother dies, she intends that the son will keep what remains in the joint account for himself.

  • Gift of the beneficial ownership of the asset (or a portion thereof) with immediate effect – in other words, true joint ownership.

Example: elderly mother adds her son to her bank accounts, intending for them to share the accounts, and, if son wanted, he could spend all the money in the accounts on himself. Regardless of who dies first, the survivor keeps what remains in the joint accounts for him/herself.

  • Trust for others, where the child holds both legal ownership and beneficial ownership, on trust for the deceased during his or her lifetime and, after death, not for the deceased’s estate, but instead for others (which may, but does not have to, include the surviving joint owner).

Example: elderly mother’s Will leaves her entire estate to charity. Mother adds her son to her bank accounts, so that the son can assist her with banking and managing finances, purely for mother’s convenience. When mother dies, she expects son to pay mother’s funeral and other bills, and then divide what remains equally between the son and one other child, but does not want the funds from the account to be part of her estate.

The advisor ought to ensure that the documentation properly evidences the intention – it is not enough simply to say that the transfer is a gift, or that the asset is held in trust. If a gift, is it an immediate gift or is it a gift which is only intended to take effect on death (i.e. a gift of the right of survivorship)?[2]  If a trust arrangement, is the trust intended to continue after death or to become a gift to the child at that time? And if the trust continues after death, who are the beneficiaries of it – the beneficiaries under the Will, or others?

Clients should consult with an estate lawyer to discuss these concepts, and obtain advice as to the best way of confirming their intentions on paper. Ideally, these consultations and the documentation of intention will happen before the transfer, but it can be possible to retroactively document these types of transfers.

3. Documenting Intention After the Transfer

A more difficult scenario, unfortunately all too common, arises when a person discloses the transfer to a legal or financial advisor only after the transfer is complete. In many cases, this occurs when the parent is obtaining banking or estate planning advice and mentions that certain asset(s) have been made joint with some other person, usually a child.

What kind of after-the-fact evidence can be produced to prove a previous intention? Pecore tells us that post-transfer evidence of intention can be considered, but that it must be closely scrutinized to ensure there has been no change in intention arising after the transfer.[3] The requirement for careful scrutiny of such after-the-fact evidence can pose problems with attempting to document the intention of a previous transfer, especially where the co-owners no longer agree what the original intention was.

In McKendry v McKendry 2015 BCSC 2433 (“McKendry”), the mother had transferred property into joint names with her son, in January 2008. There was clear evidence that, when she added him to title, she intended that he hold his interest in trust for her only while she was alive, and that on her death he was to share the land with his siblings – it was not originally supposed to be a gift of the land to just him. She later changed her mind, and in December 2010 signed a document cancelling the trust arrangement, and stating that she now wanted the son alone to receive the land when she died, as a gift from her (he did not need to share with his siblings).

When the mother later died, and notwithstanding the signed document, the trial Court rejected the son’s argument that a true gift had been made. The Court found that the key was the mother’s intention in January 2008, and that evidence contemporaneous with the transfer indicated the mother’s original intent was that the son held the property in trust for the mother – it was not to be his. The subsequent evidence (the December 2010 document) indicated only that the mother had changed her intention afterwards, which the Court held to be insufficient. The Court also rejected the alternative argument that if the January 2008 gift were not a true gift, then it was perfected or turned into a true gift by the subsequent documents.

The son, unsatisfied with this outcome, appealed the decision to the B.C. Court of Appeal. The BCCA agreed with him and overturned the lower Court’s decision. The BCCA decided that the December 2010 document had the effect of gifting the right of survivorship in the property to the son, such that he would receive the beneficial interest upon her death. By first adding him as a joint tenant, and then signing the December 2010 document, the mother had done “everything necessary” to give the beneficial interest to the son.

The Court of Appeal decision is of significant assistance in permitting parties to revisit and document the intention of previous transfers, without having to take overly technical steps such as re-conveying the property or putting a gift under seal.

The McKendry case also demonstrates the importance of documenting the intention, even if the transfer has already occurred. After-the-fact documentation remains, however, merely a way to make the best of a bad situation – clearly documenting intention at the time of transfer is certainly preferable. This is particularly true where the intention was for the child to hold the property in trust for the parent (not a true gift). If the parent and child later become estranged, and the child takes the position that the transfer was a gift, then the child will obviously not voluntarily participate in any after-the-fact documentation and will surely take the position that such documentation is evidence only of a changed intention that the court can ignore.

This is how disputes arise.

These cases illustrate that this area of law is extraordinarily troublesome, and serve as good reasons why clients should be careful, get competent legal advice, and avoid using joint tenancies as a haphazard “inexpensive” method of estate planning.

4. Severance of Joint Tenancies

“Severance” is a separate challenge that exists with joint ownership.

Land

Joint tenancy (that is, a true joint tenancy with the right of survivorship) depends on the existence of “four unities”: time, title, interest and possession. The joint tenancy will be terminated or “severed” when any one of the four unities is broken. Prudent advisors must be aware of the consequences of the four unities when using joint tenancy as an estate planning tool.

Take, for instance, the classic case of an elderly parent transferring title to her home into joint tenancy with her adult child. For a true joint tenancy to exist, the fourth unity requires that the parent and child must each have the right to possession of the entire property.

However, if the parties’ expectation is that the parent would have sole possession of the home during her lifetime, then arguably there is no unity of possession and the ownership arrangement was either not a true joint tenancy, or had been severed by the destruction of the unity of “possession” and as such is in fact a tenancy in common. As a tenancy in common, the parent’s 50% interest in the home would pass through her Will on death and not directly to her child.

Bank Accounts

The application of the four unities to jointly held bank accounts can raise even more complicated issues, partly because either joint owner has the right to withdraw all of the funds. This makes it possible for a joint tenant to sever a joint tenancy over a bank account simply by removing the funds in it.

In another recent case, Zeligs v Janes, the mother had transferred title to her residence into joint tenancy with her daughter, intending that the property would pass to the daughter upon the mother’s death. The mother and daughter sold their jointly owned home and placed the sale proceeds in a joint account. The Court found that this sale did not sever the joint tenancy over the residence; however, the joint tenancy over the sale proceeds was severed when the daughter later withdrew the sale proceeds and deposited them into account in her own name.

As a result of the severance, the daughter no longer enjoyed the right of survivorship in respect to the sale proceeds and was only entitled to retain 50% of these on her mother’s death; the other 50% had to be repaid her mother’s estate.[4] By her unilateral actions, the daughter had, unbeknownst to her, prejudiced herself and destroyed her own right as a joint owner to receive 100% of the sale proceeds upon her mother’s death.

The potential for an unexpected severance further strengthens our general advice to clients to avoid using joint tenancy simply as a blunt estate planning tool.

5. Exposure of Asset to Claimants

People who are interested in using joint tenancy ownership must also be cognizant of the risk that adding a child to title could expose that asset to the child’s creditors. If a creditor obtains judgment against the child, the creditor will likely search for assets and discover the jointly owned property, and register the judgment against it. At a minimum, this could complicate the parent’s later sale of the property, as the parent would either have to a) agree to pay the child’s debt out of the sale proceeds, or b) convince the creditor that the child actually has no beneficial interest in the property despite being on title, an explanation that creditors are not inclined to accept easily.

Another common way that jointly held property is exposed to claims against the child is in divorce proceedings, where the child’s spouse may take the position that the jointly held property is a “family asset” and subject to division. Even if this claim is not accurate, the child’s spouse can tie up title to the property by way of a certificate of pending litigation.

This complication (the potential for exposure of the jointly held property to the child’s creditors/claimants) is another reason why parents must document the intention behind a transfer. A properly drawn Trust Agreement, made before or contemporaneous to the transfer, can substantially reduce the parent’s risk.

6. Tax Treatment of Jointly Owned Assets

Other (often overlooked) aspect of placing assets into joint tenancy are the tax consequences of such transfers. The transfer of most real property into joint tenancy is a disposition of part of a capital asset, meaning that:

  1. the transfer may trigger immediate capital gains tax payable by the parent on the portion of the property that was transferred to the child;
  2. when the parent later sells the property, 1) the child may be liable for capital gains tax on the portion that was transferred to them; and 2) the parent may lose their principal residence capital gains tax exemption on the portion of the property transferred to the child.

For financial assets, a transfer to joint ownership may lead to income earned in an investment account being taxable in the child’s hands.

Without proper care, these potential tax implications of joint ownership can erode or even consume the savings hoped to achieve by avoiding probate fees as a result of the transfer. In some cases, the parent may instead find him or herself facing a significant capital gains tax bill, and adverse consequences on his or her lifestyle and retirement plan.

7. Ineffectiveness in attempting to avoid probate

As mentioned above, while the joint-tenancy approach is a popular “do it yourself” approach to estate planning, it can come with unintended consequences, and where it is done to avoid probate fees, this approach frequently backfires. Contrary to popular belief, holding a bank account or land in joint ownership with a child does not necessarily keep it out of probate when the parent dies. If it is the type of joint tenancy where:

  1. the child holds the property in trust for the parent’s estate; and
  2. there are any other assets that do require probate, such as another parcel of land, an expensive vehicle, or a large bank account; then,

the joint assets will have to be disclosed by the executor on probate and probate fees paid, because those assets still form part of the parent’s estate even though they were owned jointly.

As a result, the parent has exposed him/herself to the issues discussed above, perhaps for no benefit, because probate fees will not have been avoided.

Conclusion

Pecore and the cases that have followed it have created a transformation in the advice to be given about jointly held assets. Legal and financial advisors must pay close attention to their clients’ intentions to determine whether joint tenancy is an appropriate ownership structure, how to properly achieve the desired result, and to advise about the many potential pitfalls. The fact that this issue is one of the most frequently litigated estate-related issues in British Columbia underscores the importance of proper legal advice, whenever joint tenancies are used.

[1] One caveat to this is that assets placed into joint tenancy with spouses, have the opposite presumption – the law presumes that there is a “real” joint tenancy, i.e. that the surviving spouse will take the asset free and clear upon death of the first. Again, this presumption can be defeated by contrary evidence.
[2] Keep in mind that some of the most unfortunate resulting trust cases are those brought while the transferor is still living, where the transferor and transferee have had a falling out and now take differing views of the effect of the transfer, such as Bergen v Bergen 2012 BCCA 492.
[3] In Pecore itself, post-transfer evidence was one of the key components of the Court’s ruling. The facts showed that the father had, after the transfer, made a new will without mentioning the transferred assets to his lawyer. This suggested that the father felt he had already dealt with the account outside of his Will, by intending that it would pass to his daughter automatically, as the surviving joint tenant.
[4] One of the important concepts to come out of Zeligs is the notion that the sale proceeds could, as a “fund”, be subject to the four unities/severance analysis.

The Vandenberg Decision

Local Government’s Powers Regarding Homeless Encampments

The BC Supreme Court recently issued a decision that impacts local governments’ ability to address homeless encampments that pose a fire risk: Vandenberg v. Vancouver (City) Fire and Rescue Services, 2023 BCSC 2104. This decision clarifies that when a local government’s fire chief determines that a homeless encampment poses a fire risk, before issuing any fire order, the fire chief must perform a proportionate balancing of the fire risk against the encampment occupants’ Charter rights and must give notice of the pending order and solicit feedback from the encampment occupants about the impact of the order on their ability to find safe shelter.

Background

In July 2022, a two-block stretch of East Hastings Street in Vancouver (the “City”) was the site of a longstanding and growing homeless encampment (the “Hastings Block”). The tents, tarps, and other materials used for shelter created a fire hazard, putting the encampment occupants, the occupants of nearby buildings, and first responders at risk. On July 25, 2022, Vancouver’s Fire Chief ordered the City to clear tarps, tents, and other structures from the Hastings Block pursuant to Vancouver’s Fire Bylaw (the “Fire Order”). Two occupants who were sheltering in the Hastings Block brought a petition for judicial review and sought an order striking the Fire Order. They asserted that the Fire Order was unreasonable because it was made without considering their section 7 (life, liberty, and security of the person) and section 15 (equality) rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”).

Court’s Decision

The Court noted that the Fire Order mandated the removal of occupants’ tents, tarps, and other structures regardless of whether they were used for daytime or overnight sheltering. As a result, in the absence of viable and accessible indoor shelter, encampment occupants’ Charter rights were engaged. Given that the Fire Order engaged the Charter rights of Hastings Block occupants, the Fire Chief was required to engage in a proportionate balancing of her statutory mandate to address fire risks, against the fact that the tarps, tents, and other structures which constituted the fire risk were being used as shelter.

The Court reviewed the record documenting the Fire Chief’s decision-making process and concluded that she had engaged in a reasonable proportionate balancing of the Hastings Block occupants’ Charter rights and her statutory mandate to address fire hazards. In particular, the Court noted that the Fire Chief had considered the following:

  • the Fire Chief had determined that the tarps, tents, and structures on Hastings Block were imminent fire hazards posing a life and safety risk because they were combustible and because they were blocking fire fighter’s access to firefighting equipment and blocking emergency egress from the adjacent buildings;
  • the Fire Chief knew the occupants of Hastings Block were vulnerable and were sheltering in the tarps, tents, and structures that constituted a fire hazard; and
  • the Fire Chief tried to get assistance with re-housing Hastings Block occupants before she made the Fire Order so that the Fire Order would not have the effect of depriving them of shelter, but no assistance was forthcoming.

Next, the Court concluded that the Fire Chief owed a duty of procedural fairness to the occupants of Hastings Block when deciding whether or not to issue the Fire Order. As a result, the Fire Chief was required to notify Hastings Block occupants of the pending Fire Order and provide them with an opportunity to make submissions on how the Fire Order would affect them. The Court concluded that the duty of procedural fairness was not met in this case; Hastings Block occupants were not given sufficient notice or an opportunity to make submissions on the impact of the Fire Order on their ability to find safe shelter.

Takeaways

In the context of this decision, local governments have heightened obligations when attempting to address fire risks in homeless encampments. This decision emphasizes that local governments owe a duty of procedural fairness not just when enforcing a fire order, but when determining whether or not to make such an order. Namely, a local government’s fire chief must balance the imminent fire risk caused by tents, tarps, and other structures against the occupants’ use of those things as shelter. Where an encampment poses an imminent fire risk, before ordering decampment, fire chiefs should:

  • attempt to secure indoor shelter for all encampment occupants prior to issuing any fire order requiring removal of tents, tarps, and other structures;
  • meet with local social service agencies to understand the individual needs of encampment occupants;
  • partner with local social service agencies to disseminate fire safety information; and
  • attempt to mitigate fire risks without decampment (e.g., assisting with removal of propane tanks and providing battery operated lights in exchange for candles).

If a fire order requiring removal of tarps, tents, and other structures is necessary to address encampment fire risks, the fire chief must give notice to encampment occupants and provide them with an opportunity to make submissions about the effect of the fire order on them. Fire chiefs should ensure that their decision-making record clearly reflects this proportionate balancing and all steps taken to protect encampment occupants’ Charter rights.

If you have questions, contact a member of our experienced Local Government Team.

 

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Current Topics in Wills & Estates Law

You are invited to join our Wills & Estate team for a practical discussion of the most current topics in Wills & Estates Law.

Subjects will include MAID*, key components for your estate plan, and hot topics currently driving estate litigation, with a question/answer period to follow the presentation.

Tuesday, June 14, 2022  | 6:30-8:30 pm

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Presenters: Tyson McNeil-Hay and Matt Livingston with Jessica Vliegenthart and Leah Card.

RSVP early to law@fultonco.com as space is limited.

 

*Medical Assistance in Dying

Testamentary Capacity and Dementia

A person must be “of sound mind, memory and understanding” to be able to make a valid Will.

This means that the person must be sufficiently clear in his/her understanding and memory to know on his/her own, and in a general way:

  1. The nature and extent of his/her property;
  2. The persons who are the natural objects of his/her bounty;
  3. The extent of what is being given to each beneficiary; and
  4. The nature of the claims of others who are being excluded.

A person making a Will may be diagnosed with dementia, and still be able to have sufficient mental capacity to fulfill or to satisfy the test set out above. Even if the person suffering from dementia has delusions, that may not disqualify them as having sufficient capacity.

The relevant time in determining capacity is at the time that the instructions are given for the preparation of the Will. Even if a person’s dementia worsens prior to the signing of the Will, it can still be valid, as long as the individual knew that they were executing a Will for which they had previously given instructions.

As an advisor, questions of capacity can affect you in a number of ways:

  • May call into question the instructions you are receiving from your client;
  • If your client’s Will is later challenged as invalid due to incapacity, you may find yourself called to court as a witness to give evidence about your knowledge and impressions of the client’s understanding at the relevant time. Your notes and files may become critical forms of evidence;
  • You may want to encourage your client to seek legal advice and assistance when preparing or revising their Will. The lawyer’s job is to assess capacity, and the lawyer’s evidence is often the deciding factor when courts make a finding on capacity.

Regulating the Production and Cultivation of Cannabis

The recent case of English v. Richmond (City), 2020 BCSC 1642 provides clear direction for local governments who are regulating the production and cultivation of cannabis; specifically, the case articulates the limitations on their authority to prohibit certain forms of production pursuant to section 8 of the Agricultural Land Reserve Regulation 30/2019 (the “ALR Regulation”).

More generally, this case discusses circumstances where a court will quash a building permit decision and order mandamus.

Background

The case was brought under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, RSBC 1996 c. 241 and concerned a decision by the City of Richmond (the “City”) to refuse a building permit to the plaintiff. The building permit application was submitted on May 6, 2019 to construct a soil-based greenhouse with the intention of cultivating cannabis. The subject property was both ALR land and zoned for agricultural use under the City’s zoning bylaw.

The building inspector refused the application on the grounds that, at the time of the application, the zoning bylaw did not permit the cultivation of cannabis inside structures constructed after July 13, 2018.

At issue was whether section 8(1)(b) of the ALR Regulation was inconsistent with the zoning bylaw’s prohibition of the cultivation of cannabis inside structures. Section 8(1)(b) provides that:


the use of agricultural land for producing cannabis lawfully may not be prohibited
if the cannabis is produced inside a structure that 
 has a base consisting entirely of soil.

The standard of review applied by the court was reasonableness.

Interpretation of Section 8 of the ALR Regulation

The Court adopted a textual, contextual and purposive approach to interpret the scope of section 8. It considered statements from the Agricultural Land Commission at the time of the regulatory change to the ALR Regulation in June of 2019. The statements indicated that all forms of cannabis production are a “farm use” and that the ALR Regulation specifically allows local governments to prohibit cannabis production in certain forms.

The Court ultimately found that section 8 created a carve-out for three separate classes of cannabis production facilities that a municipality does not have the authority to prohibit which are:

  1. cannabis grown in outdoor fields;
  2. cannabis grown in structures with a soil-base; and
  3. cannabis grown in pre-existing structures or structures under construction prior to July 13, 2018.

It followed that the relevant provisions of the zoning bylaw, which prohibited the cultivation of medical and non-medical cannabis in all indoor structures, were inconsistent with section 8. As a result, the zoning bylaw was of no force or effect to the extent of the inconsistency.

Remedy for the Plaintiff

The Plaintiff sought an order of mandamus compelling the building inspector to issue the building permit.

The Court confirmed that there is authority that supports an order of mandamus requiring a municipality to issue a building permit that has been wrongfully withheld, and discussed the test for granting such an order.

The first two stages of the test require that a local government owe a legal duty to act and that there is a corresponding duty owed to the applicant: for instance, where a municipality has the public duty to issue building permits to applicants who conform to the requirements set by bylaw. The third factor considers conditions precedent that give rise to the duty, which in the present case was the building permit application process provided for and the subsequent refusal by the City.

The Court also noted the discretionary nature of the order as well as the ultimate “balance of convenience”. Importantly, the Court highlighted that an order of mandamus would be appropriate where there was no other adequate remedy available and no deficiency in the original permit application.

The Court found that the City had ample opportunity to review the application and remitting the matter back to the decision maker would just delay an inevitable outcome. As a result, the mandamus was ordered and the City was compelled to issue the building permit.

Takeaways for Local Governments

A local government is still permitted to regulate the cultivation of cannabis in some forms on agricultural lands. However, bylaws that do so will be of no force and effect if they attempt to prohibit the growth of cannabis in outdoor fields, structures with a soil base (as opposed to cement, for instance) or any structure that was being used or constructed for this purpose prior to July 13, 2018.

A court may also quash a building permit decision and grant an order of mandamus, which compels a local government to issue the refused building permit. Although the order is discretionary, in situations where the local government has relied exclusively on a bylaw provision that is of no force or effect and the application is otherwise free of deficiencies, the court will likely compel the issuance of the building permit.

 

Questions? Contact a member of our experienced Local Government Law Team.

Linda Yang

Approachable and easy to talk to, Linda has engaged in extensive social justice volunteer work in and outside Canada. Her global perspective adds invaluable insight to her legal work, as she provides practical and creative recommendations to her clients and helps them achieve their best results.

As part of our Vancouver office’s Realization Team, Linda represents both institutional and private lenders in foreclosure and insolvency proceedings. She has appeared in court numerous times on matters of mortgage enforcement, debt collection, bankruptcy and insolvency. Prior to joining Fulton, Linda completed her articles and worked as an associate at a national law firm.

Being an immigrant to Canada as a child and having completed a unique legal fellowship abroad with International Justice Mission, Linda deftly navigates different cultural backgrounds. Family and friends are of great importance to her, and you’ll often find her organizing social events to bring people together. Linda is fluent in Mandarin and speaks conversational Cantonese.

Can you use your employees’ photos or likeness?

Does your business use marketing materials with photos of current or previous employees?

If yes, you should ensure you have proper authorization from those employees.

It’s definitely easier to ask permission than to ask for forgiveness when it comes to the tort of misappropriation of personality.

The common law tort of misappropriation of personality recognizes an individual’s exclusive right to commercially use their own name, image, voice, and other components of personality that are associated with or identify that individual. If an employer uses an employee’s personality without the employee’s permission for commercial benefit, the employer could be committing the tort of misappropriation of personality. For the employer to be found responsible, the employee must be clearly identified.

An employee may give the employer permission expressly or impliedly. The Ontario Supreme Court in Horton v Tim Donut Ltd. held that the famous, late Tim Horton (a Canadian household name) impliedly assigned his publicity rights to Tim Donut Ltd. during his lifetime by allowing it to use his personality in the development of a business in which he was a partner. That said, permission may also be impliedly revoked such as following the termination of an employment contract.

Despite the fact that the majority of misappropriation of personality cases involve famous individuals, fame is not a prerequisite. In Hay v Platimun Equities Inc., the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta held that regular professionals can seek protection under this tort. The court commented “a professional’s name and reputation is entitled to be protected from unauthorized commercial exploitation every bit as much as a celebrity’s name and likeness”.

The Privacy Act of British Columbia (the “Act”) further protects the privacy of individuals. The Act states that an unauthorised use of name or portrait, including caricature, of another “for the purpose of advertising or promoting the sale of, or other trading in, property or services” is a tort, actionable without proof of damage. Under this statute, a former Wal-Mart employee was awarded $15,000 in damages after Wal-Mart used his photograph in its advertising without his permission. An interesting note is that the Act prevents any claim for wrongful appropriation upon death of the person, unlike the common law tort.

Key Takeaway

Employers should have appropriate policies and employee authorizations in place before using an employee’s photo or “likeness” for advertising.

If you have questions about how to best obtain permission for using an employee’s personality or likeness or any other workplace concerns, contact Angela Tenisci or a member of our experienced Workplace law team – we’re here to help.

Workplace Investigations: What’s the Point?

Workplace investigations allow employers to review complaints or concerns of wrongdoing, misconduct or ethical issues.

Depending on the nature and seriousness of the issue, the investigation may take different forms. Often, they can be completed internally by human resources, but in some cases, it may be more appropriate to have the investigation completed independently. Either way, the point of the investigation is usually to determine the credibility and extent of the issue, and provide recommendations for the employer. These recommendations may be anything from disciplining specific employees, to providing specific training to all employees. Either way, investigations are intended serve as a guide for employers, to assist in fixing current issues and to preventing future ones from arising.

This week, the Supreme Court of British Columbia issued the decision of Golob v. Fort St. John (City), 2021 BCSC 2192 that raised some question of the value of workplace investigations.

In this case, the Deputy Fire Chief was terminated following an investigation into complaints about his attitude, specifically as it related to his undermining of the authority of the Fire Chief. An internal investigation was conducted, but found to have been completed in a way that was biased towards achieving the result of the Deputy Fire Chief’s termination.

Ultimately, the Court upheld the termination as being for cause-based for insolence. The Court was clear that the investigation was poorly done and did not factor into the Court’s decision to terminate. Rather, the cumulative impact of the findings of insolence both at the time of the termination and acquired after the termination, led to the finding of the termination for just cause. In this case, the investigation was a nullity.

So, what is the point of workplace investigations?

  1. Even though the Court was clear that a workplace investigation may have little relevance to a court’s determination on whether a person has been wrongfully terminated, a properly conducted investigation may provide the employers with the evidence needed to uphold a termination by the courts.
    The concern with an improperly conducted investigation is that at best it will be a nullity, as it was in Golob.  However, if a court finds that an employee was wrongful terminated, an improperly conducted investigation could open an employer to aggravated or punitive damages – as in, damages in excess of what would typically be awarded at severance pay.
  2. Other claims, such as with human rights complaints, do assess whether a properly conducted investigation occurred.  In some cases, for example with sexual harassment claims, an employer could be liable for failing to properly investigate the claim – even if the claim itself is unable to be proven.
  3. An workplace investigation may also assist employers prevent future issues from arising.  Often a little prevention and training prevents much larger issues from arising.
If you have questions about how a workplace investigation could help your workplace, contact Ayla Salyn or our Workplace Law team.

We’re here to help.

Planning for Incapacity: The Right Health Care Tool for You

A startling number of us will experience dementia or other neurodegenerative disorders, and most of us will need at least some help with our finances and personal/health matters as we age. When this occurs, there are several legal tools to ensure your needs are met and your wishes are carried out, but advanced preparation is required. In terms of medical and personal care, these tools include Representation Agreements, Advance Directives, Living Wills, and MOST agreements. In this article we analyze the various tools, to help you determine which one is right for you.

Representation Agreement

What is it, and when is it used?

A Representation Agreement (“RA”) is the most common and most comprehensive (if prepared by a lawyer) planning tool for incapacitation. You appoint one (or more) person(s) to be your “Representative” and to help you make, or make for you, health care and personal care decisions on your behalf.

Even if you don’t need a substitute decision-maker 100% of the time, the Representative has legal authority to help you make your own decisions and be involved in your care. The RA allows health care providers to disclose information about your health to your Representatives, and give them access to your records.

Essentially, your Representative becomes your proxy, and your advocate; this is an essential part when navigating our health care system.

What happens if you don’t have one?

In emergencies, a health care provider can provide emergency health care to you. In routine situations, however, a health care provider must first select and get consent from a “temporary substitute decision-maker” (“TSDM”). The TSDM is determined by a priority list set out by statute: spouse, child, parent, sibling, grandparent, grandchild, anyone else related by birth or adoption, close friend, and person immediately related by marriage. You can see that this could result in persons being involved in your health care against your wishes.

The TSDM has no authority to make decisions about your personal care. Personal care includes where you live/with whom; your religious/spiritual practices; your activities, hobbies, and whom you associate with. Without an RA, there is a void – no one can legally make these personal care decisions for you.

Common situations where RAs are recommended/especially useful:

  • you are not comfortable with the statutory order of TSDM; in other words, where you have someone in your family/life whom you would absolutely not want to be involved. Don’t leave things to chance – make an RA to ensure they have no say;
  • you want someone to be able to help or direct your personal care decisions, and not leave those untended to;
  • for seniors who want to involve someone outside the family, or who don’t have a spouse or child;
  • a second marriage/blended family where there could be a conflict between a new spouse and the biological children; and
  • where there are strong religious or moral views on health care.

Advance Directives

Advance Directives were introduced in 2011 and allow individuals to leave binding instructions about specific types of health care that they accept or refuse. Used on its own, it is often ineffective; it is almost impossible to be specific enough about the type of care and the circumstances involved so as to allow a health care provider to confidently follow the Advance Directive.

An exception might be for something as simple and specific as “no blood products (blood transfusions), in any circumstances”.

The Advance Directive is only for medical treatment, so it leaves a deficiency in regards to personal care.

If you make an Advance Directive, it is highly recommended that you pair this with a Representation Agreement. Then, if the heath care provider determines that the Advance Directive cannot be followed (because it doesn’t perfectly fit to the circumstances at hand), your Representative can provide binding consent or refusal of treatment on your behalf, using the contents of the Advance Directive as a guide.

Living Will

A Living Will is a form of Advance Directive. It states your basic wishes about end-of-life treatment. It can be considered and should be followed at the time of your death. Again, they mostly serve as a guide, not a binding direction, because there are so many variables that it is virtually impossible to adequately express them all. Living Wills are very useful, however, to give your next of kin / family members a general idea of your values and wishes. The spectrum of end of life decisions can vary so greatly, from “do everything medically possible to keep me alive at all costs, no matter my quality of life”, to “I wish to be allowed to die naturally, without interference, and I want pain control even if it hastens my death”, that having a general sense of where you fall on the spectrum is incredibly helpful for your family.

Medical Orders for Scope of Treatment (MOST) Agreements

MOST agreements are prepared by your physician based on your discussions with your health care team. They are reviewed with your physician at least once a year and are stored in your electronic health record. These agreements tell your health care providers which level of care and intervention to provide to you. This option is best for adults with advancing illness or a chronic condition that is life-limiting or life-threatening.

We can help you determine which planning tool is best for you. Contact our Wills & Estates team to get started.

The “Back of a Napkin” Will

A New Challenge for Estate Advisors

When BC’s estate laws changed in 2014, one of the more interesting changes was the addition of what is often called a “curative power”. This refers to the power for the Court to “cure” a Will that is not formally valid, but still appears to represent the intention of the will-maker. This is section 58 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act.

Since the change, there have been several Court decisions that have allowed us to understand better the advantages and disadvantages of the curative proviso – and provided some practical advice to avoid the disadvantages.

The greatest advantage of the curative proviso is that it can avoid technical defects that can – in some cases, absurdly – make a Will invalid.

An example of such a technical defect would be where one of the two required witnesses has briefly left the room at the time that the will-maker signs the Will, but where it is otherwise abundantly clear that the Will represents the will-maker’s intentions. Under the old rules, this Will would be invalid, but the curative proviso allows the Court to “cure it” and make it valid.

On the other hand, the main disadvantage of the curative proviso is that it tends to create more litigation (and therefore more expense) around Wills and quasi-Will documents.

Some of the “curative proviso” cases that our firm has been involved with include:

  1. the deceased left, scattered around her home, notes concerning what would happen to her assets after her death, some of which were written on the back of receipts and grocery lists;
  2. the deceased was advised by a friend to get a Will done because of the deceased’s risky behaviour, and the deceased then jotted down two notes on a piece of paper and had the friend witness his signature;
  3. the deceased made handwritten changes to an existing lawyer-drawn Will, including a gift to a step-child who had recently come back into the deceased’s life, but did not have the alterations properly witnessed.

In our estates/probate practice we have seen many instances where the new law has increased legal expenses for estates. The new laws cause the following (costly) problem: sometimes there is no way to avoid the expensive court hearing, even if the parties agree on whether the new document should be cured. This is because a person applying for probate (i.e., an executor) must sign an affidavit stating that he/she has found no other/subsequent will or any document that might be construed to be a Will. If the executor cannot swear to this, then they have to bring to the Court’s attention any document that plausibly could be considered to represent the will-maker’s intention. The Court may then refuse to grant probate until there is a hearing on whether the document should be “cured”.

To reduce or minimize the potential for unnecessary litigation and related expenses to arise after a client’s death, we recommend practices such as the following:

  1. Advise clients not to write down draft estate planning ideas – and if they do, they should mark the document accordingly – “DRAFT ONLY” or “NON BINDING THOUGHTS” for instance;
  2. On the other hand, if the client wants the document to be taken as his/her Will, then the client should sign it and mark it accordingly – for instance, “I consider this to be my last Will” – and take immediate steps to have it properly witnessed.
  3. If a client discusses estate planning with a professional advisor, the advisor should be sure to take good notes and to record the client’s intention – has the client decided that this is what she/he wants for sure, or are these just ideas that the client intends to consider further at a later date?

If there is one standout lesson to be gleaned from the case law and the hassles we have seen in our Estates/Probate practice, it is that clients should use estate lawyers to draft and update their Wills. A lawyer-drawn Will, that is properly witnessed, avoids costly headaches that a quasi-Will otherwise creates.

Advertising Liability: Broad Policy Wordings Means Duty to Defend Likely

Blue Mountain Log Sales Ltd. v Lloyd’s Underwriters, 2017 BCSC 1872 (“Blue Mountain”), is a judgment of Justice Walker of the Supreme Court of British Columbia released on October 20, 2017. Two entities (the “Petitioners”) insured by Lloyd’s under their comprehensive general liability (“CGL”) policies sought a declaration from the Court that Lloyd’s was required to defend and indemnify them for defense costs in an action brought in the Superior Court of Washington State. The Petitioners argued that the duty to defend and indemnify was triggered by the advertising liability coverage contained in the CGL policies, one of which included the following policy wording:

Advertising Liability as used in this endorsement means:

  1. Libel, slander or defamation
  2. Any infringement of copyright or of title or of slogan;
  3. Piracy or unfair competition or idea misappropriation under an implied contract;
  4. Any invasion of right of privacy;
  5. Any of the foregoing alleged by any other name,

Committed or alleged to have been committed during the Policy Period in any advertisement, publicity article, broadcast or telecast by or on behalf of the Insured and arising out of the named Insured’s advertising activities.

Occurrence as used in this endorsement means any advertisement, publicity article, broad or telecast or any combination thereof involving the same injurious material or act, regardless of the frequency of repetition thereof or the number of kind of media used


The underlying action in Washington (the “Washington Action”) concerned a claim for unfair competition made by a group of related companies referred to collectively as “GBS.” GBS alleged that the Petitioners misappropriated trade secrets, namely involving a secret proprietary product used to treat roofing wood products referred to as “Thermex.” The allegations made in the Washington Action were laid out in the pleadings as follows:

  • The Petitioners gained proprietary Thermex information from a former owner and officer of GBS;
  • The Petitioners utilized this information to develop a new product called “CPX”;
  • The Petitioners misled government regulators to obtain approval to market and sell CPX;
  • The Petitioners marketed and sold CPX, passing it off as their own under a different trade name; and
  • The Petitioners marketed CPX to certain trades in the industry and to the public on a website and otherwise, representing through advertising that CPX was identical to Thermex, which caused them damages.

Initially, when the Washington Action was filed, Lloyd’s acknowledged a duty to defend. It was not until the Petitioners amended their pleadings by narrowing them to remove some advertising related content in the Washington Action that Lloyd’s advised that they no longer held the position that they owed a duty to defend. This prompted the Petitioners to bring an application in the British Columbia Supreme Court for coverage.

Lloyd’s argument justifying their change of position was technical in nature. In particular, the revised pleadings in the Washington Action claimed under Washington’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) for misappropriation of a trade secret, which included “disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent.” Lloyd’s employed the use of a foreign law expert at the application, whose opinion it was that 1) advertising was not a constituent element of a misappropriation claim under the UTSA, and 2) that the UTSA pre-empted other claims for unfair competition based in the common law or otherwise. As advertising was not a component of the statutory claim, Lloyd’s argued, the facts as pleaded relating to advertising could not ground a claim and therefore could not invoke coverage.

Lloyd’s relied heavily on the well-known Supreme Court of Canada case Lloyd’s of London v Scalera, 2000 SCC 24 (“Scalera”). Lloyd’s presented the argument that Scalera held that, for the purpose of determining whether coverage is possible, and hence whether the duty to defend is engaged, it is the specific elements of the pleaded cause of action that determine the outcome. Scalera had involved an underlying claim alleging sexual battery by a bus driver upon a passenger, pleaded both in negligence (in relation to seeking consent for the battery) and as an intentional tort (in relation to the battery itself). The relevant insurance provided coverage for negligence, but excluded coverage for intentional acts. The Supreme Court of Canada found that a claim for battery always involved an intent to injure and could not be grounded in negligence, and as such the exclusion applied and the duty to defend was not triggered. The attempt to claim in negligence was entirely derivative in nature and had no effect on the determination of whether the exclusion applied. Lloyd’s argued that the same reasoning applied in regards to advertising and the UTSA claim.

The Court in Blue Mountain disagreed with Lloyd’s characterization, citing that Scalera merely required the “substance” and “true nature” of the claim as pleaded to be considered when determining whether the duty to defend is invoked given the ease in which pleadings can be manipulated for this purpose. The relevant inquiry is to compare the policy wordings and the substance and true nature of the claim. In making this inquiry, there must only be a mere possibility that a claim falls within the insurance policy. In Blue Mountain, the relevant policy wordings covered a  broad array of advertising based losses, and the advertising which occurred was central to GBS’ alleged damages. Furthermore, employing the “pleadings rule” required a plain reading of the amended Washington Action pleading, and the intentions behind why the Petitioners amended their claim could not be utilized as a basis for determining coverage. Lloyd’s was stuck with the wording contained in the amended pleadings, which outlined various advertising activities and connected same with unfair competition and resulting damages.

In the context of an advertising liability case, the Blue Mountain case is significant in that it reiterates that the same interpretive principles will apply in determining whether a duty to defend exists regardless of the form of CGL coverage implicated. Policies and pleadings will be interpreted expansively in favour of an insured. Absent an obvious attempt to manipulate pleadings to invoke coverage, the decision in Scalera will not readily be applied. However, it is worth noting that many forms of advertising and personal liability coverage are framed in policies with reference o legal causes of action, such as slander or libel. When coverage is defined less broadly and references only a legal cause of action without more, then the argument advanced by Lloyd’s in Blue Mountain may well have a possibility of success.